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Commentary/Seoxle: Consciousness and cognition
empty categories, case theory, etc.), namely, there is "a hard-
ware level of interpretation." By the same logic, we can elimi-
nate the strange and complex constructions of quantum theory
and molecular biology: it is much simpler to say that the
phenomena are explained by unknown properties of unknown
mechanisms.
Searle also offers an alleged reductio of the explanation of (1)—
(4) in the manner indicated. The latter, he says, is "exactly
analogous" to what he calls sarcastically "the deep unconscious
rule" (R): "if it is infrared, don't see it." There is an analogy, but
not the one Searle gives. His (R) is analogous to the rule: "if it is
(4), don't understand it and regard it as deviant." (R) is thus an
odd formulation of one of the facts to be explained, but contrary
to what Searle assumes, it is in no way analogous to the proposed
explanation of these facts. The difference between the prin-
ciples of UG and Searle's (R) is the difference between signifi-
cance and vacuity, a rather considerable one.
There are numerous other problems in Searle's account, but
putting them aside, the "cognitive science paradigm," as he
terms it, is in no danger from these considerations. For many
years, Searle has been attempting to provide a critique of the
approach that I and others have taken to UG. In response, I have
repeatedly argued that his objections reduce ultimately to a
demand for conscious accessibility, one that is arbitrary and
pointless, despite its distinguished ancestry. His latest effort is
of value, I think, in making it more clear than before that this is
exactly what is at stake, and that it makes no sense at all. Putting
aside questions about Searle's account of the history of the
matter (see Chomsky 1980a, Chapter 6) there is no doubt that
the demand for conscious accessibility has deep roots. Searle's
paper provides another indication that it is a fundamental error,
and should be abandoned.
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Ultimately, I suppose, there is only physics. But our scientific
world-view posits a set of overlaid-structures; the chemical, the
social, even the computational. Searle offers a timely, elegant,
and disturbing assault on one of those layers - the citadel of the
information-processing unconscious. His goal is to show that
information-processing descriptions (except insofar as they pick
out states which are in principle accessible to consciousness)
have no intrinsic place in such a hierarchy of levels. His main
tool is a requirement of aspectual fixity (i.e., the world must be
presented under a particular description, e. g., the glass of water
presented as water and not as H2O). The only way of getting
such aspectual fixity, he argues, is by appeal to the nature of our
conscious awareness.
Searle may be right about aspectual fixity. Indeed, the whole
notion of an aspect seems bound up with that of a conscious point
of view. But if this is to be an argument against the ontology of
information-processing psychology, Searle must show not just
that we lack (for the unconscious cases) a notion of aspectual
fixity, but also that we lack a notion of algorithmic fixity. This I
believe he fails to do.
Searle's argument depends on demonstrating that there is (in
the case of in principle unconscious "mental contents") no
logical space available between neurophysiological descriptions
of the brain, on the one hand, and functional descriptions which
are merely a reflection of the particular interests of conscious
theorists on the other. But (pace Searle) I believe we have a
robust and respectable notion of just such a space. I shall try to
say why.
Searle's idea is that we must treat putative cases of non-
conscious information processing either as gestures at the actual
neurophysiology or as statements about functional role. He is
careful to add, however, that the functional description is not to
be seen as a legitimate level of a scientific ontology (unlike, say,
chemistry). Instead it is "simply one of the causal levels de-
scribed in terms of our interests"). Thus, when we say that the
heart functions to pump blood, all we are doing (according to
Searle) is highlighting those of its (brutal, physical) causal
powers "to which we attach some normative importance" (sec-
tion 4, p. 12, my emphasis).
But this downgrading of the idea of a genuine functional level
of description is deeply unconvincing. To see why, we need to
consider the way (a) a story about historical origins and (b) ways
of differentiating algorithms, can combine to yield a robust and
fully realistic notion of the nature of selecting a particular
algorithm.
The historical dimension is straightforward (see, for example,
Millikan 1986). It is surely true that the heart has the function it
has quite independently of my attaching normative importance
to that function (pumping blood). For that physical structure
would not exist were it not for its ability to perform that function
- it has been selected (by a nonconscious mother nature)
because of its functional role.
Consider now the idea of a cognitive module whose task is
(let's suppose) the computation of shape from shading as part of a
low-level vision system. We can argue, in ways directly analo-
gous to the above, that the functional description picks out a
proper, full-blown level of scientific description. For the struc-
ture was selected because of its ability to compute shape from
shading. It is at this point that the reality of algorithms must be
recognized. For there will be many different ways of computing
shape from shading. The theorist will now want to discover
which algorithm nature as exploited. There are various ways to
do this. Different algorithms will yield different relative re-
sponse times for different classes of problems. And different
pathologies will be possible according to exactly which informa-
tion-processing strategy is in use. (Virtually all of psycho-
linguistics and much of cognitive neuropsychology are devoted
to such fine-grained differentation of algorithms). Nothing in the
target article looks to undermine this conception of the func-
tional and algorithmic fixity of particular information-processing
descriptions - a fixity achieved independently of the conscious
accessibility of its contents and the idiosyncratic normative
interests of the human theorist.
A second worry is that the crucial notion of what is consciously
accessible "in principle" is left dangerously vague, so vague, in
fact, that it runs the risk of becoming trivial. Thus we are told
that any genuinely contentful but unconscious mental state is
one which is at least "the sort of thing that can be brought to
consciousness." But in response to (legitimate) worries about
pathologies and "blockages" (see, e.g., sect. 6, para. 2 and 3)
Searle is forced to unpack this in terms of a notion of the "in
principle" as opposed to the "actual" accessibility of the con-
tents. But this is problematic. Consider the following thought-
experiment. Suppose (I do not for a moment believe it to be so
simple!) that conscious awareness was caused by the develop-
ment of an extra mental module which monitors and recodes the
activity of other modules. Suppose, furthermore, that humans
have and hamsters lack this module. But it turns out to be
biologically feasible to "add on" a consciousness module to the
hamster so that it can monitor, integrate, and recode its own
lower level information processing. Does this show that the
hamster actually had those (unconscious) mental states all along?
Were those states (in Searle's terms) in principle consciously
accessible? If so, it seems as if there may be no limit, after all, on
the extent of our unconscious mental contents! Searle might
reply that imagining such extensions to the hardware is illegiti-
mate. But suppose we discover, in the human pathological
cases, that what is causing the "blockage" is, precisely, damage
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (1990) 13:4 601
Commentary/Searle: Consciousness and cognition
to such a module. Then how can we justify allowing determinate
unconscious content where the creature has a (damaged from
birth) receding module yet disallowing it to creatures who
simply lack the module? Indeed we may, if we wish, suppose
that the damage just is the absence of the module from birth!
What this case suggests is that the notion of in-principle ac-
cessibility to consciousness, once it is weakened to deal with the
cases which Searle addresses in section 6, may become too
liberal to be of use. Perhaps there is a way of adding hardware to
a cactus so that it becomes aware of the way its own growth is
stimulated by sunlight! Even so, this had better not imply that
the cactus, here and now, has just such latent, but genuine,
intentional states.
In sum, the stress on aspectual fixity looks doubly blighted. It
is blighted because the crucial notion of in-principle ac-
cessibility of some state to conscious (aspect-fixing) awareness is
ill-specified. And it is blighted because such fixity may in any
case be a red herring as regards information-processing psy-
chology. For the content-using descriptions of such a discipline
require only the cheaper algorithmic fixity which can be pur-
chased by a combination of causal history (the device was
selected because of its information-processing abilities) and
instantaneous structure (it can be seen, for example, to imple-
ment a specific shape from shading algorithm).
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This commentary will be short because its main point is rather
straightforward. In his target article, Searle argues strongly
against the general notion of unconscious mental processes as
typically postulated by cognitive science and maintains that this
notion is "a mistake." His major argument is that unconscious
mental processes imply some kind of intentionality, whereas, as
he argues, we cannot invoke the notion of "intrinsic inten-
tionality" without reference to consciousness. Thus, according
to his position, unconscious mental processes "cannot exist."
The major problem with Searle's position is that he appears to
understand the notion of unconscious processes in a manner that
is based more on the lay (and "everyday language") tradition
than on contemporary cognitive research on mental processes,
where these terms have the status of hypothetical constructs in
an explanatory system aimed at generating empirically verifia-
ble hypotheses. Searle's notion of unconsciousness stresses
mostly the aspect of the "intentionality" which is not only
irrelevant to (or even inconsistent with) what cognitive investi-
gators of those processes have studied, but it also appears
conceptually erroneous, at least in not being instrumental (be-
cause the concept of intentionality seems very difficult to opera-
tionalize for cognitive research).
The distinction between conscious and unconscious mental
processes in cognitive research is based not on the motivational
(or psychodynamic) concept of "intentionality" but rather on the
informational concept of "ability," that is, whether specific
information can be accessed at specific levels of processing (e. g.,
the "ability" to report verbally on information or the functional
"accessibility" of specific information). There are quite trivial
(and difficult to refute) reasons for maintaining the current
(cognitive) notion of unconsciousness as defined in terms of
informational access. The most important of these is the abun-
dant empirical evidence for the existence of qualitative dif-
ferences between the Functional status of information that (a) can
be accessed by the individual in a consciously controlled manner
(e.g., reported, identified, explicitly used in reasoning) and
information that (b) cannot be accessed in this way but is still
stored in memory and can systematically affect cognitive pro-
cesses (Hill et al. 1989). [See Holender: "Semantic Activation
Without Conscious Identification in Dichotic Listening Para-
foveal Vision, and Visual Masking: A Survey and Appraisal" BBS
9(1) 1986.]
Searle's arguments might be useful in explicating some com-
mon features of the "metaconceptual" or philosophical nature of
conscious and unconscious processes. They do not appear to
provide evidence for any flaws in the current distinction be-
tween these two categories of processes (as understood in
cognitive psychology), however, because this distinction is sim-
ply justified by the empirical data themselves. Even if one could
imagine convincing linguistic or other formal arguments against
using the specific term conscious/unconscious to denote the
empirical differences mentioned above, there would still be a
need to make up a term for those differences because their
functional and conceptual importance for the entire field of
cognitive science is firmly established (Lewicki & Hill 1989). To
convince cognitive researchers otherwise would require dem-
onstrating that the huge body of empirical data in support of this
distinction is somehow invalid.
We acknowledge the importance of philosophical reflection
on even those issues and questions that can be ultimately
resolved only by empirical research (e.g., the specificity of
unconscious as compared to conscious mental processes). The
contribution of such reflections, however, should be measured
by the extent to which they provide guidance for empirical
research (i.e., its eventual specific functionality for that re-
search). It appears that in order to offer such guidance, Searle's
Connection Principle is in need of further elaboration.
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Searle focuses on three questions to which we "need to know"
the answers if we are to understand a biological phenomenon:
(1) What is its mode of existence?
(2) What does it do?
(3) How do we find out about it?
He leaves out the one type of question that most scientists spend
their time on:
(4) What is its fine structure?
To use Searle's example: What sort of pump is the heart? This
type of question is of particular concern to us, for it is in trying to
answer (4) that linguists have been led to postulate rich innate
representational structures which are not accessible to con-
sciousness. These are precisely the sorts of entities that Searle
believes to border on the incoherent.
To help see how such entities bear on Searle's claims, it is
worth considering a sample account in a bit of detail. Consider
the data in (5):
(5) a. The men like each other
b. *Eaeh other like the men
c. The men expect each other to win
d. *The men expect Mary to kiss each other
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